Management Adviser
Volume 9

Number 3

Article 5

5-1972

Venturing Beyond the Pass
John Walsh

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtadviser
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons,
and the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Walsh, John (1972) "Venturing Beyond the Pass," Management Adviser: Vol. 9: No. 3, Article 5.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtadviser/vol9/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Management Adviser by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Communication—from the top down as well as from
the bottom up—is indispensable to the success of a
new product or service. Management’s criteria and
biases must always be clear to R & D —

VENTURING BEYOND THE PASS
by John Walsh
Arthur D. Little, Inc.

one company suc
solely on one or the other will be
disappointed.
ceed and another fail in the
area of new products or services? Let us look at the birthplace of
new products. Obviously, a new
There are, I suggest, two major
venture is developed either in
factors influencing success or fail
house or from without. But point
ure-management and communica
of origin probably has little correla
tions. Does management know
tion with success. What is im
where it wants to go and does it
portant is whether the idea lands
make its direction clear to the rest
on fertile soil, and whether this
of the company? Are a company’s
fertile soil is linked to the rest of
lines of communication open for
the organization by open commu
receiving and developing new ideas
nication channels. Usually there is
and are specially skilled individuals
a great deal of communication from
part of the management team—a
the top down but very little from
sort of task force on new oppor
the bottom up.
tunities and undertakings?
New venture success requires
One company’s experience
two approaches. One is methodical,
requiring organization and plan
Perhaps the best way to illustrate
ning. The other is opportunistic,
these points is in terms of an actual
requiring fast response time and
case history. Let’s begin by de
flexibility. The company that relies
scribing the development of Prod
hy does
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uct A which failed to become
commercial, followed by a parallel
discussion of Product B which be
came an outstanding success.
Product A was developed in the
research and development labora
tories of a company. It was given
adequate budget, and the devel
opment people in charge felt quite
sure that they knew management’s
criteria. The project proceeded very
successfully. It was pilot planted
and samples were given to the mar
keting department.
Unfortunately, back at the pass,
management did not know what
it wanted. It had no clear ideas as
to the desired volume of business,
level of profitability, or extent to
which it was willing to commit
its technical, marketing, and man
agement time and resources. Mar
keting and production were simManagement Adviser

ilarly uncertain about taking on a
new project. In short, no one in
the firm had articulated a risk
taking philosophy. While the de
velopment group continued to re
ceive encouraging reports of man
agement’s enthusiasm, manage
ment’s actual conversations went
something like this: “Here’s another
new project; the marketing people
don’t seem to want to press it; the
production people find that it
doesn’t fit with their scheduled
plans; the financial department says
it’s going to lose money for three
years.”
Further lack of commitment was
shown by the division managers
whose bonuses were in part deter
mined by short-term profits and
who were not willing to see some
red numbers. To make matters
worse, management not only lacked
real enthusiasm for the project; it
also didn’t have the courage to
stop it. As a result, money was
spent and test marketing done far
beyond any reasonable hope of
return.
Needless to say, the company
finally licensed Product A to
someone else, hoping to get a little
of its money back. This process left
everyone with a very dim view of
developing new projects in the fu
ture.
A different outcome

The idea for Product B was
also developed in a different com
pany’s own research and develop
ment laboratories. By contrast,
however, management had estab
lished its criteria, had articulated
its risk-taking philosophy, and had
told the financial department that
money was to be spent for new
ventures. In this case, the research
and development department took
management’s criteria into account
in developing its idea.
When management committed
further money, it was not just to
reinforce the status of the R & D
department: it was a sincere com
mitment to go ahead with the pro
ject if, indeed, it appeared promis
ing. The technical part of the proMay-June, 1972

A project which the R & D people think has management's firm support
all too often has nothing of the kind; management is lukewarm at best and
kills the project when it finally reaches implementation stage.

ject went quite well. The marketing
department proceeded to prepare
the groundwork for the company’s
entry into the business of distri
buting and selling the product.
At this point, however, an almost
insurmountable obstacle arose. It
became apparent that the project
would require a far greater amount
of capital than the company was
willing or able to commit. Man
agement knew, however, that it had
a proprietary position. Though it
had traditionally avoided joint ven
tures, it decided to take an oppor
tunistic view and to look for a part
ner.
The critical factor here was the
existence of strong communications.
Marketing was talking to produc
tion; production was talking to re
search; research was talking to
management. The people at all
levels knew what was wanted, and
they knew that even though a joint
venture violated company tradition,

it could be done and would be
acceptable.
In the new partnership, the ori
ginating company had the product,
the imagination, and the risk-taking
ability. The other partner had the
raw materials and financial re
sources.
Throughout these and other case
histories, the key to success or fail
ure was communication. Too often
a project is well conceived and is
pushed vigorously, but when it
reaches top management, as a re
quest for a budget or approval for
a plant, management anguishes for
a while and then decides against
it. This is a communication prob
lem. Clearly, any project could be
stopped much earlier if manage
ment didn’t want it and let all con
cerned know it.
Most good projects that fail do
so at the very top management
level. One company, for example,
was interested in diversifying into
33

One of the easiest and least

expensive ways of initiating
new developments is for a
company to keep lines of

communication open with its
outside sources. Though
many companies scoff at this

approach, it is, in fact,
productive. For every new

venture idea conceived
internally, nine are probably
thought of by raw material

suppliers or customers.
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the aerospace industry. It stated
there were to be no geographical
limitations. When the project finally
reached top management, the re
sponse was negative. Management
said, “Certainly we are not going
to support a venture on the West
Coast.” Obviously, with better com
munications, management’s geo
graphical bias would have been
known much earlier in the game.
Another company had a develop
ment that was technically brilliant
and well developed commercially
but ended up as an unwanted con
sumer item. The board of directors
in this case said, “We have no in
tention of going into a consumer
type product.” In both cases, a
good deal of effort and money
could have been saved if manage
ment’s real criteria had been made
explicit.
When ventures fail, you will
usually find that R & D developed
products which it thought manage
ment wanted, but which, in the
final analysis, management didn’t
want at all, or you will find that
management thought R & D knew
what it wanted. Ask management
what it wants from R & D and
then ask R & D what it thinks man
agement wants, and you will find
two different answers in most cases.
Also vital to the success of any
new venture is the recognition of
risk by research, management, and
marketing. No new venture ever
succeeded without paying the cost
of entry into the market. This is
paid either in R & D money, in
advertising money, or in a high
price-to-earnings multiplier for ac
quiring a company which has what
is needed in terms of product or
marketing. If the financial group is
controlling the company and sets
an unrealistic return on the dollar
spent without recognizing that it
costs money to get into the game,
most projects will fail. Unless a
company is willing to pay the price
and sign a chit ahead of time, there
is little point in doing new venture
and new product research.
One of the easiest and least ex
pensive ways of initiating new de
velopments is for a company to

keep lines of communication open
with its outside sources. Though
many companies scoff at this ap
proach, it is, in fact, productive.
For every new venture idea con
ceived internally, nine are probably
thought of by raw material sup
pliers or customers.
This approach can be so effective
that it should be company policy
to take the initiative—to approach
suppliers and customers, point out
the company’s production, market
ing, and technological capabilities
and ask if they might not be di
rected to serve the subject’s need.
What about the administrative
personnel needed to develop profit
able new products and services?
First, you need a man capable
of recognizing good ideas and of
communicating them so as to win
management support. This man
cannot and should not be asked to
commercialize the product. He
should get it to the point where
he can turn it over to the commer
cial development group. Next, you
need a commercial development
man. This man must be paid by
the company to evaluate and to
take risks. Sometimes he must have
the courage to say that even though
$5 million has been spent, there is
no reason to go any further.
In summary, it can be seen
that the critical thread that runs
throughout all successful new ven
tures is communication—between
various company departments,
management levels, and outside
sources. This means more than just
meetings and memos. It means true
communication whereby the im
plicit values of all those involved
are congruent with their explicit
actions.
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